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Institutional Factors Influencing Urban Land Governance in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Moges Amare¹

Abstract

The study aims to investigate institutional factors affecting urban land governance conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It uncovers how institutions, formal and informal, shape crucial aspects of urban land governance, including land tenure. Using a mixed-methods approach, it gathered rich data from diverse stakeholders: land officials, residents (formal and informal), brokers, and land managers. Interviews, questionnaires, and focus groups revealed a positive correlation between the quality of institutions and effective land governance. Strengthening both formal and informal rules, upgrading informal settlements, digitizing land management, and regulating land brokers were identified as key steps towards a more fair and sustainable land system in the city.

Key Words: Land, Governance, institutions (formal-informal), Urban Land Governance, Addis Ababa

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Introduction

Cities are undergoing rapid transformations, creating opportunities and challenges in equal measure (Mathias Tesfaye & Megento, 2016). They serve as catalysts for economic, social, and cultural change (Home, 2021), often serving as the crucible for significant global socioeconomic shifts (Chigbu, 2021). While urbanization offers progress, it also brings negative consequences like congestion, pollution, and weak infrastructure, often stemming from inadequate land governance (Qadeer, 2016). Urban governance extends beyond municipal authorities, encompassing a complex web of social, economic, political, and cultural actors—both formal and informal—including markets, communities, civil society, and diverse interactions within the urban environment (Takele et al., 2014). Improving urban governance, crucial for improved city life and well-being, is a complex endeavor demanding comprehensive efforts (Udessa et al., 2021). Land governance within cities, therefore, appears as a vital and intricate field of study in the realm of urban governance (Hafsi & Chabi, 2019).

Governance issues permeate all levels of society—local, regional, corporate, national, and even global. Despite its frequent mention of literature and policy analysis, "governance" is still a nebulous term, lacking a precise and universally accepted definition. The Commission on Global Governance views it as the sum of diverse actions by individuals, groups, markets, civil society, public and private entities (Vymětal, 2015; Weiss, 2000). It serves as a mechanism for reconciling conflicting interests and fostering cooperation. However, its complexity leads to varied interpretations and definitions among scholars (OECD, 2017; Qadeer, 2016; WBG, 2018).

Defining "institutions" presents equally daunting challenges, with no universally satisfactory explanation (Hodgson, 2016). The term permeates social sciences and finds usage in diverse disciplines such as politics, sociology, philosophy, and geography (Ménard & Shirley, 2009). Despite its ubiquity, its meaning is still contested, making it difficult to arrive at a precise, comprehensive, and universally accepted definition. However, attempts to explain and unravel its meaning are not fruitless. Institutions can be understood universally as "a system of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions" (Ménard & Shirley, 2009). Examples include language, money, firms, law, and measurement systems. They encompass written rules, contractual agreements, and unwritten norms, beliefs, and cultural

practices that aim to reduce uncertainty and control our environment (Hodgson, 2016; Ménard & Shirley, 2009).

Institutions play a profound role in social life, subtly or overtly shaping human interactions through established guidelines and rules (Beck, 2012). They serve as the source of ordered thought and expectations, shaping the development of consistent institutional frameworks governing human action (Hodgson, 2016). Institutions can both enable and constrain action (Ostrom, 2009). Language rules ease communication, traffic rules ensure smooth vehicular flow, and the rule of law enhances security. Conversely, institutions can also impose limitations. Business licenses restrict unregulated economic activity, and constitutions and laws restrain government power. Institutions guide human behavior, for better or worse (Ostrom, 2009; Paraskevopoulos, 1998; Pike et al., 2015).

Traditionally, neoclassical economists focused on factors of production (capital, technology, and labor) as the primary drivers of economic growth, neglecting the crucial role of institutions (Beck, 2012). However, today, robust institutions are recognized as critical engines of growth and development, with differences in institutional quality being key factors in explaining development disparities across nations and societies. Developed countries tend to have institutions that foster progress, while underdeveloped nations often lack such enabling frameworks (Andriamihaja et al., 2021). Given the critical role of institutions in shaping urban land governance, which itself runs within an institutional framework, understanding the interplay between institutions and urban land governance becomes central to ensuring sustainable and fair city development.

Land: What It Is?

Land serves as the very foundation of human existence, particularly in the context of urban life and development (Home, 2021; Rithmire, 2013). From infrastructure expansion and revenue generation to industrial growth and overall socioeconomic activity, cities thrive on the land upon which they are built (Misganaw-Gashaw, 2021). Beyond urban settings, land is vital for food production, shelter provision, and economic development (OECD, 2017). Given this critical role, understanding how to effectively manage and govern land becomes a crucial scientific inquiry.

Urban land transcends mere space; it embodies power (Kivell, 2002). Ownership grants economic and social advantages, making it a key part of government planning and a driver of inclusive and sustainable urban development (Home, 2021). Proper land governance lies at the heart of creating safe, livable, and enduring urban communities. Ignoring such governance can lead to unequal access and development (Home, 2021). This importance also stems from the inherent link between land and the environment. Rapidly expanding urban areas pose serious environmental challenges due to their resource consumption, highlighting the need for sustainable land management.

The term "land" itself carries a complex and contested meaning (Borras & Franco, 2010). In economic terms, it is not just soil but also fixed elements like forests, minerals, and agricultural products (Haffner, 2018). Land use policies are therefore vital for any nation, affecting economic prosperity, environmental protection, and social equity.

Urban land has unique features that set it apart from other resources:

- Relational Location: Each piece has its own relative location, defined by accessibility and connections to other areas.

- **Three-Dimensional Space:** Urban land transcends ground level. Buildings create verticality, forming a three-dimensional space that can be considered urban land (e.g., a third-floor office).
- **Bundle of Rights:** Ownership grants a "bundle of rights," including the right to use, sell, transfer, and make decisions about the land. These rights, however, vary depending on local regulations and contexts.
- **Clustering Asset:** Urban land exists interconnectedly, forming continuous units. While divisions may exist, there is an inherent clustering nature.
- **Heterogeneity:** Each parcel is unique, varying in location, size, shape, tenure, and other characteristics.
- **Immobility:** Unlike renewable resources, land is fixed and immovable. While reclamation is possible, its location and physical nature are permanent.

Recognizing the critical role of land, international development institutions like the FAO, World Bank, and IMF have placed substantial emphasis on land-related policies (Borras & Franco, 2010). Conferences and reports highlight the global focus on land as a tool for reducing poverty and improving lives (OECD, 2017).

Urban land governance goes beyond ownership. It encompasses the decisions, regulations, and mechanisms that guide how land is accessed, used, and managed (Home, 2021). When such governance is weak, the powerful often receive help from scarce land resources, leaving the majority disadvantaged. Access to and use of land, along with land tenure security and effective management, directly affect people's lives and overall development (Home, 2021).

Strong land governance needs robust institutions that enforce rules, ensure transparency, and promote accountability. Without it, achieving fair, sustainable, and efficient land use becomes challenging. While several African countries have undergone land reforms since the 1960s, land-related challenges persist, highlighting the need for continuous improvement in land governance systems (Chitonge & Harvey, 2021).

Good governance principles like participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, tenure security, consensus, inclusiveness, and equity are crucial for effective urban land governance (Home, 2021; Miller, 2013; Pain et al., 2016; Wang, 2012). Integrating land into the broader governance framework of cities is essential for building sustainable and thriving urban communities.

Urban Land Governance

Urban land is more than just soil – it is power, livelihood, and the foundation of thriving cities. Yet, poorly governed land benefits only the powerful, leaving others behind. Land governance encompasses decisions, rules, and how they are enforced (Home, 2021). Strong institutions that uphold transparency, accountability, and equity are crucial. Without them, land use becomes inefficient, unsustainable, and fuels inequality (Chitonge & Harvey, 2021).

In Africa, the focus on land governance has gained momentum due to its crucial role in development and poverty reduction. Effective governance can achieve fair land use, protect land rights, and reduce conflict (Home, 2021). Land is particularly vital for the poor, often their only assets and livelihood. Weak governance leaves them vulnerable to insecure tenure and displacement (Kuch & Chipman, 2018).

Integrating land into the city's governance framework, ensuring participation, accountability, and justice for all. Only then can cities unlock the full potential of land and build a future where everyone benefits.

Urban Land Tenure

Defining land tenure is not easy. It is a complex web of rights, power dynamics, and historical legacies, often characterized by informality and ambiguity (Chitonge & Harvey, 2021). This complexity fuels land tenure challenges in Africa, especially in urban areas, where weak governance worsens the issue.

Africa's dominant land tenure system, customary tenure, sparks debate (Arko-adjei, 2011). Some argue it offers less security than formal tenure with title deeds. Others view it as crucial for preserving cultural traditions and land use practices. This "conservation vs. replacement" debate highlights the need for nuanced approaches that respect local contexts while adapting to evolving urban needs.

Urban land tenure security poses a significant challenge for policymakers, planners, and researchers (Grindle, 2007). UNCHS emphasizes that weak land policies and insecure tenure in urban areas fuel inequality and poverty (UNCHS, 2007). Secure land access is crucial for the urban poor to build shelter and improve their lives (Arko-adjei, 2011).

Formal housing sectors often do not meet the demand for land in developing countries, leading to the proliferation of informal settlements (Alain & Royston, 2012). This informal expansion, representing over 50% of urban settlements in some regions, is further challenged by poor land governance (Durand-Lasserre, 2019). The threat of eviction, lack of basic services, and insecure tenure hinder economic opportunities and integration for the urban poor.

Land tenure goes beyond mere ownership; it is about trust in institutions safeguarding land rights and minimizing eviction risks (Etingoff, 2016; Freire et al., 2007). Secure tenure empowers individuals to invest in their land, take part in community development, and access loans (Durand-Lasserre, 2019). It supplies stability during unemployment and retirement, fostering better livelihoods and well-being.

Measuring tenure security is another conundrum (Lombard & Rakodi, 2016; Pike et al., 2015). Some argue simply finding its presence or absence is insufficient, while others propose a three-factor approach: breadth (range of rights), duration (continuity), and certainty (legal protection and enforcement cost). However, debates stay about whether wider bundles of rights truly enhance security, as they can raise land values and trigger land grabbing (Arko-adjei, 2011; Ubink et al., 2009). Moreover, individual titling can threaten the rights of vulnerable groups like women and children.

Further complexities arise from distinguishing between de jure (legal framework) and de facto (actual practices) tenure security (Ubink et al., 2009). Strong legal frameworks mean little if informal settlements face constant displacement and rights violations. Conversely, high de facto security among informal landholders may benefit less from formalization efforts. As Peterson's studies in Ethiopia and other African countries prove, issuing certificates alone does not guarantee enhanced security (Peterson, 2006).

In conclusion, understanding land tenure in urban Africa demands a nuanced approach that acknowledges its inherent complexity and historical context. Addressing the challenges requires collaboration between policymakers, researchers, and communities to develop inclusive and flexible solutions that secure land rights, promote sustainable development, and build fair cities for all.

Urban Land Governance Theories

Urban governance, like a multifaceted puzzle, cannot be explained by a single discipline. It draws from diverse fields like politics, political economy, and social sciences, each offering a unique perspective (Home, 2021; Kivell, 2002).

Political Theory: Traditional views portray the state as a sovereign power reflecting the public's will, guided by philosophies like democracy. However, others challenge this, viewing the state as shaped by individual actions, diverse beliefs, and conflicting views on authority (Home, 2021).

Historical Institutionalism: This theory examines how past decisions and events influence current behaviors (Dube, 2013; Home, 2021). Path dependence argues that past actions constrain present choices, with a change in course requiring adaptable political institutions. The adoption of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) exemplifies how external factors can alter urban development trajectories.

Actor-Network Theory: This theory focuses on the complex interactions within urban landscapes through networks of diverse actors, including humans and objects (Andriamihaja et al., 2021; Home, 2021; Taşan-Kok & van Weesep, 2007). It examines how networks run, highlighting the critical role of actor-networks in urban land governance. These networks include individuals, concepts, institutions, and both state and non-state actors like urban civil societies. Isomorphism, the tendency of institutions to mimic each other's structures or processes, plays a crucial role. For example, weak states may adopt legal and organizational frameworks without effectively fulfilling their intended functions. Another example is governments' repeated promises to curb land sector corruption, often to little avail.

Land and Sustainable Development: Sustainable urban land governance is key to promoting sustainable development, improving livelihoods, and reducing poverty (OECD, 2017). However, defining sustainable development itself is a complex endeavor with varying interpretations from international agencies. The UN's definition, for example, emphasizes meeting present needs without compromising future generations' ability to meet their own (SDSN, 2021). This notion of intergenerational equity pushes us to consider the long-term implications of our present actions on available resources.

Land as a Crucial Pillar: Recognizing the essential role of land in sustainable development, most of the 17 SDGs recognize sustainable urban land governance as a critical pillar (Macharia, 2019; Miller, 2013). This concept refers to the fair and efficient management of this scarce resource for the common good of present and future generations. Equitable land use can be a powerful tool for poverty reduction, ensuring that elites do not exploit land systems at the expense of the vulnerable (De Simone, 2015; Palmer et al., 2009).

By appreciating the various theoretical lenses through which we can understand urban governance, we gain a deeper understanding of its complexities and challenges. This, in turn, allows us to develop more effective and comprehensive solutions for building sustainable and fair cities for all.

Institutions as Factors of Urban Land Governance

Using land for the common good of urban residents requires a robust and effective land governance system. At the heart of this system lies the quality of its institutions (Ammann & Förster, 2018). Well-functioning institutions have the power to improve governance across the

board, leading to better land use and better lives for urban residents. Conversely, weak institutions undermine land governance, hindering social and economic progress (Hodgson, 2016).

Institutions play a crucial role in shaping the behavior of actors involved in urban land governance. Strong institutions incentivize rational and productive land use, while weak institutions allow for exploitation and mismanagement (MÉNARD & M., SHIRLEY, 2009). For example, in areas with weak governance, land resources are less likely to be used for the common good, potentially leading to inequality and poverty (Ammann & Förster, 2018).

Effective land governance needs a high-quality institutional framework (Home, 2021). One key aspect of this framework is decentralized, local self-governance. By empowering local communities to plan and manage their land resources according to their specific needs, we can reduce informality and ensure fair access to land, particularly for the poor (Arko-adjei, 2011). This initiative-taking approach, involving communities in land use planning before informal settlements appear, is crucial for preventing future challenges.

Land-related challenges in Africa are often linked to institutional and policy failures (Bobek, 2019; Home, 2021; Ostrom, 2009). Without addressing these systemic shortcomings, including weak housing, insecure land tenure, inadequate infrastructure, and inappropriate land use practices, it becomes almost impossible to use land for the common good, including the benefit of marginalized communities. These challenges are often further worsened by poor governance within urban areas.

Investing in robust and transparent institutions is the fundamental step towards achieving fair and sustainable urban land use. By empowering local communities, strengthening legal frameworks, and prioritizing ethical governance, we can unlock the potential of land to build inclusive and thriving cities for all.

Problem Statement

Land, a crucial element of urban governance, has become a complex and contentious issue in Ethiopia, particularly in Addis Ababa. The city's land is plagued by rampant land grabbing, fueled by weak institutions and poor governance practices. This essay dives into the challenges caused by this ineffective land management, focusing on the specific case of Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian government has displaced residents for development projects, often without proper consent or compensation, violating land rights and dispossessing Indigenous communities (Mahlet-Makonnen, 2018). Studies by Gebrihet & Pillay (2021) and Necha et al. (2014) reveal a multitude of governance challenges across major Ethiopian cities, including Addis Ababa. Lack of accountability, transparency, public participation, and rampant corruption plague the urban land sector.

Addis Ababa's land is considered the epicenter of corruption, with illegal fencing of green spaces, land grabbing by individuals and institutions, and mismanagement of the Land Bank being commonplace (Asamere, 2022; EzegaNews, 2019). Addis Ababa's green areas are rapidly disappearing, replaced by built-up infrastructure at an alarming rate, further harming the city's sustainability (Tsfaye & Lika, 2016).

While past studies have acknowledged the presence of good or bad urban land governance in Ethiopia, few have explored the root causes of ineffective governance and its impact on land tenure. Additionally, research often focuses on customer satisfaction rather than the deeper institutional factors influencing land governance (Tsfaye & Megento, 2016; Bonsa, 2012).

This study aims to fill these gaps by:

- Analyzing the role of institutions in shaping urban land governance in Addis Ababa.
- Examining how institutional factors affect land tenure, land use, land administration, and overall governance.
- Finding the interaction between land actors and the institutional environment.
- Increasing awareness of how institutions influence land governance and tenure security.
- Contributing to the understanding of how urban land functions within institutional frameworks.
- Generating guidelines for developing effective institutions for sound urban land governance.

By delving into land grabbing and poor governance in Addis Ababa, this study looks to propose solutions for creating a more fair and sustainable urban land management system. Understanding the institutional roots of the problem is crucial for tackling it effectively and ensuring that land serves the common good, not the interests of a few.

Materials and Methods

This study adopts a pragmatic worldview, informed by mixed-methods research. This dynamic and flexible approach allows for integrating quantitative and qualitative data sets, supplying a multifaceted picture of how institutions influence urban land governance (Creswell, 2009).

Design: The study uses an explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory mixed design (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017). This mixed model, employing a concurrent triangulation strategy, capitalizes on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods, aiming to find convergence, differences, or nuanced combinations between various data sources.

Target Population and Sampling: The research focuses on two of Addis Ababa's largest sub-cities, Bole and Yeka, chosen for their representative size and population. The target population encompasses land authorities, employees, leaders, residents (formal and informal), and land brokers. These diverse actors embody the institutional factors shaping land governance, making them crucial to the study.

Sampling Techniques: Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed. A random lottery system selected respondents for the quantitative questionnaire survey, while purposive sampling ensured access to participants for interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and selection of sector offices. This approach eased the gathering of detailed data from individuals with relevant knowledge and firsthand experience.

Sample Size: The study employed Kothari's formula ($n = \frac{p(q) z^2}{e^2} = \frac{(0.5)(0.5)(1.96)^2}{(0.05)^2} = 384$) to decide the sample size (Kothari, n.d.). Two FGDs (one per Woreda) and key informant interviews with selected sector managers were conducted.

Data Sources: The research used both primary (questionnaire, interview, FGD) and secondary (books, articles, prior studies, reports) data sources.

Data Collection: Land employees and local community members received questionnaires. Key informant interviews were conducted with land managers, and two FGDs were held with local communities (8 participants each, for an hour's duration). These tools enabled the collection of diverse data to address the study's aims.

Data Analysis: Quantitative data was categorized and organized for analysis. Textual data underwent thematic analysis to extract relevant meaning. Inferential analysis using ordinal regression was employed for quantitative data, presented through tables, charts, and

percentages. The model ($ULG = B_0 + B_1FI + B_2II + e$) explored the influence of formal (FI) and informal (II) institutions (ULG) on urban land governance, with "e" being the error term. Formal institutions encompass relevant laws, regulations, and actions undertaken by land authorities, while informal institutions refer to unwritten rules, cultural norms, values, and networks that interact with formal structures. The researcher used thematic analysis to analyze qualitative data.

Ethical Considerations: The study adhered to strict ethical guidelines, ensuring participant genuineness, openness, respect, confidentiality, and freedom from manipulation. Data fabrication was strictly avoided. These measures ensured ethical research conduct throughout the study.

Results and Discussion

A questionnaire of five hundred was distributed to respondents (forming employees, residents (formal-informal holders), out of which only 431 of the questionnaires were reached by the researcher, satisfying all the requirements. This implies the rate of return to be near 86%, guaranteeing for continuing to the next step of the research. FGD and key informant interviewees (including land managers and land brokers) were also done.

Descriptive Statics

Sex and Educational Profiles of Participants

The demographic, Table 4.1, proves more than half of the participants were male (around 54%), the rest 46% are female respondents. This can show that who, male or female, engages more in land related issues such as land transaction, who might also receive help from such transactions. The interviewee and focus discussion results also showed male have strong networks and institutional connections when compared to female counterparts. This may tempt us to conclude that informal transactions of land tend to favor or help male when seen from general demographic features

No		Frequency	Percept	
1	Sex of Respondents	male	233	54.1
		Female	198	45.9
		Total	431	100.0
2	Education	Illiterate	19	4.4
		Grade1-8	38	8.8
		Grade9-12	72	16.7
		Diploma	107	24.8
		Degree	151	35.1
		Above degree	44	10.2
	Total	431	100	

Source: own survey (2023)

Most of the respondents have an educational qualification that enables them to read and understand the questionnaire with little support from data collectors, above 86% of the respondents have an education level of grade 9 and so (See Table 4.1). Out of these respondents' diploma, degree, and master's holders were the dominant, collectively accounting for around 70% of the total participants of the study. Illiterate participants represented less than 5% of participants. The higher the educational level, the better the data collected from such samples will be.

Illiterate participants were made to answer the questionnaire with the help of data collectors who read the questionnaire and its choices so that they show their right choice. The fact that the illiterate does not read does not mean they do not understand and lack reliable data. They are a rich source of data and supply excellent facts related to land issues on the ground.

Therefore, having solid background information about the respondents would help us to go to the next phase of the analysis. How each participant understands the questions and their respective responses and key issues appearing are going to be presented and analyzed thoroughly. In addition to the backgrounds said so far other information such as holding type, number of transactions, and net gain from such transactions has also been discussed.

Table 2 Holding Type and Number of Transactions Done

Holding type		Frequency	%
Holding type	formal	111	25.7
	Informal	118	27.4
	No holding	202	46.9
	Total	431	100
Number of transactions	0	223	51.7
	1	124	28.8
	2	76	17.6
	4	2	0.5
	5	6	1.4
	Total	431	100
	Average no of transaction	6	
Number of court visits	0	291	67.5
	1	60	13.9
	2	56	13
	3	10	2.3
	4	10	2.3
	5	3	0.7
	6	1	0.2
	Total	431	100

Source: own Survey (2023)

Table 2 shows respondents' holding type if they hold land in the city; people who have land may be as formal or informal, whether the holding is recognized legally yet. So, 202 (46.9%)

were non-holders, 111 (25.7) had formal recognition, and the rest 118 (27.4%) of the respondents had informal holding.

Thus, the majority respondents had either no holding or informal holding; accounted for close to 74% (320) of the participants. This shows the number of formal and informal holders is almost equivalent. This again shows the growing number of informal holdings and, in such holding tenure insecurity, is expected to be a stiff challenge. Empirical studies show a significant number of landholders in Africa are informal (Arko-adjei, 2011; Ubink et al., 2009), More than 70% of holding in Addis Ababa is informal, including kebele houses (Fransen & Van Dijk, 2008). Thus, the result confirms with the prevailing empirical work.

The second row of Table 4.2 shows out of the total 208 (48%) respondents engaged in a land transaction at least once within the last five years, they involved in buying or selling a house formally or informally. Only a few individuals have taken part twice or more. 223 (52%) of the participants did not take part in any land transaction. This may imply that significant numbers of individuals are out of the land market, a few people reap the benefit that may occur in land related transactions. This is common in the Global South, land employed for the interest of a few elites (Home, 2021; Kuch & Chipman, 2018),

Respondents were asked how many times they have visited the judiciary (court) because of issues about their holding. Only 140 (32%) have declared that at least once they visited a court to manage land cases. The rest 291 (68%) have not visited court in the last five years. The reason could be they do not own land or have no problem with land violation or lack confidence to go to court. Informal holders also tend not to go to court even if their possession is transgressed, because they may not have the evidence (legal documents) that the court needs to entertain the case (See Table 4.2). To ensure better land tenure security, people or holders need to have trust in the legal court, speedy trial, less costly, and quality judgment encourage holders to take cases to court once their right is violated. Otherwise, if there is a lack of confidence on court decision, extra-judicial action will prevail over court litigation, which includes force and violence (Arko-Adjei, 2011; Lombard & Rakodi, 2016).

Tenure Security Related Questions

This includes data presentation and analysis related to questions about tenure security. To what extent do holders or potential holders feel secure about their land holding? Do they feel guaranteed they will not be displaced by authorities, individuals, and do they believe the law will protect them effectively? Absence of tenure security has serious bad repercussion from distorting private life up to encumbering overall development efforts, including resulting instability, which African case is an example. The instability prevalent in Africa is correlated with lack of land tenure security (Crewett & Korf, 2008; Hafsi & Chabi, 2019; Ubink et al., 2009).

Land dispossession is one indicator of poor tenure security. In this regard, respondents were asked to share their experience if they meet the challenge of being uprooted from holding by government authorities, individuals, or groups or have seen such an event in their surroundings. Based on this information, 208 (near to 48%), 146 (around 34%), 23 (approximately 5%), and 19 (4%) respectively replied strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree. From this 354 (82%) of participants, being the majority, at least agreed with the forwarded question, that is, the presence of significant ousting of landholders. Some respondents, 35(5%), showed they did not experience by replying to "Don't Know".




Figure 1 Presence of Land Dispossession

This response of participants shows that the act of uprooting holders is a widespread phenomenon implying security problems. Data obtained from FGD also strengthen this claim, there were participants who explained their feeling severely, many have been dispossessed from the place where they have lived several years. This problem of displacement manifests in areas where there is large informality (see Figure 1). This finding is found to be similar to the works of Gebrihet & Pillay (2021), and Sungena et al., (2014) who showed in their finding that significant number of land holders in Ethiopia have been displaced by government action.





Figure 2 Absence of Land Eviction

Respondents were asked whether there were few or non-events of land eviction. This question has been introduced to prove the consistency of respondents' replies with respect to displacement. So, 167 (approximately 39%) and 173 (40%) of the participants disagreed and strongly disagreed with the question posed, that is, 340 (79%) of the respondents minimally disagreed with question of absence of land eviction, showing wide presence of eviction or ousting of holders. Only few respondents, 74 (close to 17%) of respondents, at least, agreed with the question, and the rest of the 17 (around 4%) have no information or knowledge on it.

The response clearly revealed that the majority, minimally more than 340 (79%) of the participants, the presence of land eviction; holders, formal or informal, have been exposed to arbitrary decision of uprooting from one's place of residence and holding (see Figure 2). Studies show, the eviction rate is growing from year to year as leadership change in land authorities occurs in Addis Ababa city (FBC, 2021; Yusuf et al., 2009; Zeru-Haile, 2016). In Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, displacement is common, has often done by government authorities (Ubink et al., 2009).



In Figure 3, a question was introduced to participants about their feelings of the judicial system, if the respondents have confidence in court action and decisions. Based on this, 133 (31%) and 200 (46%) of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively, at least 333 (77%) of the respondents disagreed, being the majority. Whereas 23 (near 5%) and 52 (12%) strongly agreed and agreed, respectively. The rest 23 (close to 5%) have no detailed information.

Therefore, the response tells us that the majority, 333 (77%), have confirmed that they did not have confidence in the activities of courts or their decisions. This shows the presence of poor security, if respondents lack trust with the judicial decision, they will not be willing to take cases to a court or forced to use other means such as corruption or personal action (force) to

protect one's land rights. A number of studies have confirmed this, especially it is common in Africa and other poor countries (Etingoff, 2016; Freire et al., 2007; Jemal-Abagissa, 2021)




Figure 4 Adequate compensation for the Displaced

There is a possibility that one could be dispossessed when government needs the land for development purposes, but with proper compensation that puts the displaced in equal or better life condition before displacement. In this regard, participants were asked by participants whether they have obtained adequate compensation if they had the experience of displacement or what they observe in their surroundings when people displaced. Based on this view, 171 (near to 40%) and 168 (approximately 39%) of the respondents disconfirmed the question posed by responding disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively, making the substantial number of respondents, 339 (79%), minimally disagreed with the claim that government provides adequate compensation when city residents displaced from their holding for public reasons. Only few respondents, 79 (near to 18%), agreed at least with the assentation provided, the rest 13(3%) did not have clue whether the uprooted rewarded sufficient compensation or not.

It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the evidence obtained from participants shows that public agencies did not sufficiently support residents in terms of covering compensation that enables the displaced to lead a life standard at least equivalent to that of prior displacement (see Figure 4).

When land disputes or violation of rights to land occur, courts or the judicial system play a crucial role. Court decision is the last guarantee for the protection of individual property rights. This is true only if the judicial system is accessible in terms of cost, distance, and time. Clients always want to finish the litigation process with minimum financial cost and speedy trial, otherwise the desire to go to court to protect land rights will disappear, and other options will replace it.




Figure 5 Accessibility of the Court

To understand to what extent court services are accessible to the community, a question was then sent (See Figure 5). As the stated Figure shows, 182 (42%) of the respondents disapproved that the judicial system is accessible by showing disagreement, in addition, 160 (close to 37%) of the participants strongly disagreed. While few respondents, 7 (close to 2%) and 41 (near to 10%), strongly agreed and agreed. The remaining 41 (around 10%) did not reveal their position.

Thus, the majority 342(79%) of the respondents disconfirmed that court services in relation to land matters is not accessible, the cost of ligation surpasses the benefit gain, meaning there might to be corruption that prompt clients to pay to the case, or the case may take several months or years without decision, cost of hiring a lawyer and court fee to initiate the case may also have accessibility implications. One of the criteria of tenure security is accessibility of the judicial system in relation to land matters (Crewett & Korf, 2008; Legese-Tigabu, 2015; Lorenzo Cotula, 2004; Ubink et al., 2009).

The question in Figure 6 was asked whether respondents have confidence that legal protection suffices to protect land-related rights. Do respondents feel that the existing land laws will be fully practiced in case violation happens? This is to check the effective execution of the laws. Sometimes there can be laws, but they may not be implemented, the *de jure* and *de facto* may not be similar.

In this perspective, 118 (27%), 154 (near to 36%), 39 (9%), 111 (close to 26%), of the respondents respectively replied disagreed, strongly disagreed, strongly agreed, and agreed, suggesting that 272 (63%) of the respondents, representing the majority, at least disagreed with the question that the legal regimes guarantee land rights.




Figure 6 acquire Effective Legal Protections

This means that the substantial number of respondents, 272 (63%), did not believe or lack confidence that existing laws will guarantee their holdings. This is also supported by the data generated by the FGD. There were individuals who lost legal holding in court litigation, or their holding is taken away by individuals who have political affiliation. In less developing countries like Africa, Latin America, and Asia, effective implementation of land laws is less effective and poor (Hafsi & Chabi, 2019; Lorenzo Cotula, 2004; Philip, 2015).

Inferential Statistics

Institutional factors Influencing Urban Land Governance.

The following model has investigated the major institutional factors. The model applied ordinal regression as the data collected was found not normally distributed. Normality for all variables is significant ($P < 0.001$) as seen from Table 4.3, which implies the data was not normally distributed. When the data is not normally distributed, the ordinal regression model is proper. The data was also converted to log form, but the normality did not change.

$ULG = B_0 + B_1FI + B_2II + e$ Where ULG: Urban land governance, FI: formal institutions, II: Informal institution

Table 3 Test of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
ULG	.101	431	.000	.980	431	.000
FI	.072	431	.000	.991	431	.008
II	.094	431	.000	.973	431	.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Own Survey (2023)

As the literature on institution reveals, institutions can be grouped as formal or informal (Home, 2021; Peters, 2019), land governance is not only affected by the formal structure of the state or government but also by the informal interaction among actors, including formal-informal interactions. The formal institutions include formal laws starting from the constitutions, proclamations, regulations, and directives applicable at various levels to govern social, political, economic aspects of society. While informal institutions include the culture, tradition, practice, norms, values, networks manifested among the actors.

When seen in relation to urban land governance, FDRE constitution, various land laws at federal or regional levels, and implementing such laws are under the formal category. It is all about formal decision making and implementation in relation to urban land. How the existing laws ensure tenure security of landholders, distribute land rights fairly and equitably among the society. The informal dimension includes how informal interactions among society, politicians, land brokers, feeling, culture, and feelings promote or limit urban land governance. Such as Informal practices have the potential to influence land governance of a city.

Table 4 Parameter Estimates and Model Fitting

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Ninety-five percent Confidence Interval		
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Location	FI	3.146	.330	90.920	1	.000	2.499	3.793	
	II	3.565	.307	135.291	1	.000	2.965	4.166	
			Goodness-of-fit.		Model Fitting Information				
		Chi-Square	df	Sig.	Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson		1177.617	1598	1.000		822.950	878.205	2	0.000
Deviance		653.798	1598	1.000					
Pseudo R-Square 0.875									

Source: Own Survey (2023)

A questionnaire (five hundred) was distributed to the target samples and 431 were properly returned to the researcher. Thus, the analysis was conducted based on this collected data. Before conducting the analysis, the normality of the data was analyzed, and found not normally distributed (See Table 4.4, $P < 0.01$, showing the data is not normally distributed). When the overall data is not normally distributed, the model is the ordinal regression model is applied in this analysis. It was designed as:

$$ULG = B_0 + B_1FI + B_2II + e$$

Where: ULG: Urban land governance,

FI: formal institution,

II: Informal institution

Before conducting, the model must be checked if it fits the data. For goodness-of-fit, the X2 (Chi-square, $df=1598$) result was 1177.617 with $P > 0.05$, which is insignificant, meaning the model fits the data. Similarly, the model fitting information was significant ($P < 0.01$), meaning

it is a good model. The Pseudo R-square was 0.875, which shows approximately 88% of the change in the dependent variable (urban land governance) due to change in the quality of independent variables (formal and informal institutions). After evaluating the model, ordinal regression analysis was run in SPSS with the summary results inserted Table 4.4.

The analysis result depicts, formal Institution (FI) was a significant positive predictor of urban land governance (ULG). For every one unit increase in the quality of FI, there is a predicted increase of 3.146 in the log odds of being at a higher level on ULG (See Table 4.4). Similarly, the informal institution (II) was found to be a significant positive predictor, where the result in Table 4.4 shows there is a predicted increase of 3.565 in the log odds of being at a higher level on ULG for one unit increase in the quality of informal institutions. The findings confirm that institutional factor significantly affect the conditions of ULG (Amanor, 2012; Enemark, 2012; Fukuyama, 2008).

Conclusion

The study findings confirm presence of poor tenure security in the land sector of the city: abound displacement, ineffective application of land laws, inaccessibility of courts, poor judicial confidence, growing number of informalities, and so on, shows defective tenure security. Weak land tenure security will have its own repercussion that limits proper use and management of urban land: discourage holders to invest resources and time on the land and affect to use land for collateral purposes.

To improve overall governance, increasing the quality of formal and informal institutions is especially important, as the quality of institutions significantly decides the nature of the ULG. The formulation and execution of land laws, such as constitution, proclamations, regulation, and directive, are significant determinants. Addition, informal structures such as culture, norm, value, practice of land actors affect ULG. The interaction between formal and informal institutions also influences ULG.

Recommendation

Increasing the quality of formal institutions which includes improving existing land laws so that the laws be pertinent to sound land governance, when doing so take part all land governance actors including the residents. Having good land laws alone is not sufficient; it requires effective implementation which in return demand effective administration and quality human resources that are well-disciplined. It is also important for boosting the social capital such as their culture, attitude, norm, and value toward land. In other words, foster informal institutions. Note such tasks will not happen overnight, may take several years, overall institutional improvement requires achieving elevated level of development and reduction of poverty. Corruption, backwardness, poverty are products of poor institutional quality.

The speculation coupled with poor discipline of land brokers adversely affects the land sector, especially land transaction or market. It is proper to design rules that guide the informal land brokers and codes of conduct that is expected of them. To be a broker there needs to be a certain requirement that combines education, behavioral characteristics, and license to do so.

Land is a big asset, source of economic and political power, particularly for third world countries, there has been a digital land inventory system that records each piece of land, its location, nature, size, owner, and other land characteristic features. This closes doors for cheating and misuse.

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